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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In most countries including Australia, children become eligible to start school in the year 
they reach a certain age, typically 5 years old, by a given cut-off date. For instance, in 
New South Wales, children can enrol in school if they turn 5 on or before the 31st of July 
of that year. As a result, children born only a few weeks apart end up in the opposite 
ends of the age and maturity scale in the classroom. Those who were born just before the 
cut-off date typically end up among in the youngest, whereas those born just after the 
cut-off date end up among the oldest.  
It is well known that children who are among the oldest in the classroom tend to have 
higher academic achievement, self-confidence, and are less likely to suffer from 
psychological and behaviour problems. While the advantage in academic achievement is 
large in the early years of school and vanishes during adolescences, some studies have 
suggested that the positive psychological effect of having been among the oldest versus 
the youngest in one’s peer group could be long lasting. These studies show that people 
who were among the oldest in their school cohort are over-represented in occupations 
that are associated with being self-confident, competitive and risk seeking, such as being 
a CEO, elite athlete or a politician.  
We investigate directly whether the positive psychological effect of having been among 
the oldest among one’s peers persists in adulthood. We conduct an online incentivised 
survey experiment with a sample of Australian adults aged 24 to 60 years who were either 
among the oldest or the youngest in the classroom. We find that having been among the 
oldest in one's peer group during school age is positively associated with self-confidence 
in adulthood, the propensity to declare higher risk tolerance in real life situations and 
trusting others. 
Our findings indicate that school entry rules influence the formation of behavioural traits, 
creating long-lasting disparities between individuals born on different sides of the cut-off 
date. Our findings highlight the importance of recognising the potential adverse effect of 
school entry rules when designing educational policies.  
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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the long lasting effects on behaviour of relative age at school. We conduct 
an online incentivised survey with a sample of 1007 adults, who were born at most two 
months before or after the school entry cut-off date in four Australian states. We find 
those who were among the oldest in the classroom throughout their school years display 
higher self-confidence, are more willing to enter in some form of competition, declare 
taking more risk in a range of domains in their life and are more trusting of other people, 
compared to those who were among the youngest. 
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1 Introduction
Having been among the oldest or the youngest in the class throughout the educational
trajectory has been found to have significant effects on a range of outcomes measured later
in life. Those who happened to be among the oldest in their cohort tend to have higher
educational attainment (Crawford et al., 2014).1 They also tend to be more successful in
competitive environments such as sports (Allen and Barnsley, 1993), managerial positions
(Du et al., 2012) and politics (Muller and Page, 2016).2 Smaller and short-lived effects have
also been found on earnings (Fredriksson and O¨ckert, 2014).3 However, the mechanisms
underlying these differences in long term outcomes are not well known.
In this study we investigate if the experience of being among the oldest or youngest in
the classroom throughout the school trajectory can have a sustained effect on behavioural
traits deemed important for success later in life. We conduct an online incentivised survey
experiment with a large sample of 1007 Australian adults aged 24 to 60 years old who were
either among the oldest or the youngest in the classroom (henceforth referred to as relatively
old / young) and elicit their self-confidence, competitiveness, risk tolerance, trusting attitude
and patience. We find that having been among the oldest in one’s peer group during school
age is positively associated with self-confidence in adulthood. We also find a positive effect of
relative age in school on the propensity to declare higher risk tolerance in real life situations
and trusting others.
The potential advantage in children’s psychological development stemming from being
among the oldest in the classroom has been a subject of interest in psychology, and more
recently, in economic research. Studies with children and adolescents have shown that being
relatively old in the school cohort influences self-confidence and social interactions in school.
1See also Bedard and Dhuey (2006); Datar (2006); Puhani and Weber (2007); McEwan and Shapiro
(2008); Smith (2009); Elder and Lubotsky (2009); Grenet (2009); Fredriksson and O¨ckert (2014). Using
German data, Mu¨hlenweg and Puhani (2010) also find that relative age positively influences the chances of
self-selecting into an academic versus vocational school stream at age 10.
2See also Musch and Grondin (2001).
3See also Grenet (2009); Black et al. (2011).
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For instance, Crawford et al. (2014) show that relative age influences children’s belief about
potential achievement in school. They explore the variation in school entry cut-off dates in
England and apply a regression discontinuity design on a sample of children born around the
school entry cut-off date. They find evidence of an advantage for relatively old children on
self-confidence which is three times as large as the gap between children with high and low
socio-economic advantage.
There is also evidence that relatively old children have higher self-esteem (Fenzel, 1992;
Thompson et al., 1999, 2004), are less likely to suffer from psychological and behaviour
problems (Goodman et al., 2003; Mu¨hlenweg et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015), and school
victimisation (Mu¨hlenweg, 2010). Dhuey and Lipscomb (2008) find that relatively old high
school students are more likely to be involved in leadership activities at school and in a
previous study we find that relatively old boys are more competitive (Page et al., 2017).
Fewer studies have looked at the persistent effects of relative age, when small age dif-
ferences become less consequential in terms of cognitive and physical development or when
individuals cease to be in an environment where they systematically are among the youngest
or the oldest, typically encountered after leaving school. For instance, using longitudinal
representative data sets from the US and Canada, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) find a positive
effect of the relative age on the likelihood to attend university, even though the advantage
in tests scores for relatively old students vanishes in the adolescent years. Using Swedish
administrative data, Fredriksson and O¨ckert (2014) find that people who were relatively old
in their cohort are likely to have completed more years of education than those who were
relatively young. Moreover, they report a stronger effect of relative age for women and indi-
viduals from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds. In contrast, using Norwegian
data, Black et al. (2011) find no impact of relative age on educational attainment. Both
Fredriksson and O¨ckert (2014) and Black et al. (2011) find little evidence for an effect of
relative age on life cycle earnings. Other studies document an over-representation of indi-
viduals who were relatively old in their school cohort in jobs where high interpersonal skills
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and self-confidence are likely to be important, like politicians (see Muller and Page, 2016,
for evidence from the US) and CEOs of very large companies (Du et al., 2012). Bai et al.
(2018) also document that mutual fund managers who were relatively old at school outper-
form those who were relatively young and that this is linked to differences in the adoption
of confident financial behaviour.4
Our study contributes to several areas of research. First, by providing empirical support
for long-lasting consequences of relative age in school on behavioural traits, our study adds
to the investigation of the behavioural explanations for the relative age effect. Participants
who were relatively old in school and those who were relatively young behaved differently in
our experiment. The former were substantially more self-confident about performance in an
effort task and more willing to be competitive as a result than relatively young participants,
despite the absence of a performance advantage. They also declared taking more risk and
trusting people more in real life. Our findings suggest that part of the long-lasting effect
of relative age on career choices may be attributable to the difference in self-confidence and
risk attitude created by the experience of being relatively old or young in the classroom.
Second, this paper extends the literature on children’s behavioural traits. Many large
studies have investigated behavioural differences among children by eliciting economic pref-
erences such as risk aversion or time preference (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Sutter et al.,
2013a; Castillo et al., 2018). Our study relates to the research on the role of education in
the formation of these behavioural traits (e.g Borghans et al., 2008; Cunha and Heckman,
2009). Specifically, our findings indicate that school entry rules influence the formation
of behavioural traits, creating long-lasting disparities between individuals born on different
sides of the cut-off date. Our findings highlight the importance of recognising the potential
adverse effect of school entry rules when designing educational policies.
4Focussing on long lasting effects also has the major advantage of providing ‘clean’ evidence of the relative
age effect as it is not affected by the classical problem of the relative age being confounded with absolute
age (and time spent in school) as found in studies with children and adolescents. Some studies focussing
on educational achievement try to eliminate or weaken this problem by exploiting regional variation in the
school entry cut-off dates (Crawford et al., 2010; Smith, 2009). Crawford et al. (2014) find that absolute age
is likely to be the main explanatory factor for a relative age advantage on academic achievement.
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Finally, to a lesser extent, our study contributes to the literature investigating the role of
behavioural traits in career success. Our results suggest that an individual’s self-confidence
may be a key ingredient to success beyond actual performance. The difference in self-
confidence and risk attitude created by the experience of being relatively old or young in
the classroom may play a role in explaining the long-lasting effect of relative age on career
choices.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section II we describe our study design, including the
empirical strategy, participant pool, experimental procedure and hypotheses. In Section III
we present our results and in Section IV we provide a general discussion of the study.
2 Study design
2.1 Empirical strategy
We use the exogenous variation in relative age at school to investigate its long-lasting effect
on behavioural traits. Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that relative age in Australia
is primarily determined by an exogenous rule, the school entry cut-off date. School entry
rules create a discontinuity in the probability to be relatively old at school around the cut-off
date. A cut-off date determines when children are expected to start school. Children born
before the cut-off date reach the required age of entry to school before that date and they are
deemed old enough to start. Children born after the cut-off date do not reach the required
age in time and they have to wait until the following year to be deemed old enough to start
school. A direct consequence of cut-off dates is that children born after the cut-off date
who entered school a year later are older among their peers, while children who were born
before the cut-off date and entered right away are younger among their peers. In practice,
compliance with cut-off dates is often imperfect, for instance, some children born before the
cut-off dates are sometimes held back one more year and end up being relatively old among
their peers.
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Our identification assumption is that being born just before or just after the cut-off date
can be considered to be an accidental event, independent of family characteristics. Specifi-
cally, the timing of birth around the cut-off date is uncorrelated with family characteristics
which can influence the child’s behavioural traits. Previous studies using data from differ-
ent countries including Australia have shown that this assumption is generally reasonable.5
Therefore, individuals born only a few weeks apart in the vicinity of the cut-off date are likely
to be very similar, yet those born after the date had a very high chance of being relatively
old in the classroom while those born before had a high chance of being relatively young.
In practice, we chose the smallest window around the cut-off date that allowed us to reach
a suitable sample size. Participants in our study were selected so that they were born at
most two months before or after the school entry cut-off date applied to the state in which
they attended school.6 In addition, we recruited across four Australian States with cut-off
dates placed either at the end or middle of the year to reduce the risk of unobserved family
differences associated with seasonal variations in the timing of birth.
To measure the actual relative age, we use the participant’s declaration of whether she7
was among the oldest or the youngest in the classroom, and whether she has repeated or
skipped primary school grades. A participant complied with the school entry cut-off date if
her actual relative age corresponds to the relative age predicted by the cut-off date rule. We
call this predicted relative age her assigned relative age.8 Table 1 presents the breakdown
of our sample in terms of relative age. Among the 530 participants who were born after
5See for example Dickert-Conlin and Elder (2010) for evidence from the US, Black et al. (2011) for
evidence from Norway and Ryan and Zhu (2015) for evidence from Australia. For Australia in particular,
using data from the Longitudinal Survey of Australian Children, Ryan and Zhu (2015) show no evidence
of a discontinuity around the school entry cut-off date in several relevant characteristics including mother’s
education, parents’ country of birth, the main language spoken at home, number of siblings, mother’s age,
child’s gender, the incidence of the child having a medical condition, Indigenous status, birth weight and
current height.
6To ensure that our results are not dependent on the size of this window, we reproduce in Appendix D.2
all our main results on the subsample of participants born only 1 month before or after the cut-off date. We
observe that results are broadly identical on this subsample.
7For simplicity, we use the female pronoun throughout to denote a generic participant in the study.
8A participant complied with the cut-off date if she was either born before the school entry cut-off date in
her state and declares having been among the youngest in her classroom, or if she was born after the school
entry cut-off date and declares having been among the oldest in her classroom.
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the cut-off date in their state, 385 (73%) were among the oldest in their cohort. Similarly,
among the 477 participants assigned as the youngest in their cohort, 358 (75%) were in fact
among the youngest.
Table 1: Actual and assigned relative age
Assigned relative age
Actual relative age Oldest % Youngest % Total
Oldest 385 73 119 25 504
Youngest 145 27 358 75 503
Total 530 100 477 100 1007
Note: Count and (column) percentages of participants
whose assigned relative age, determined by whether they
were born before or after the school entry cut-off date in
their state, corresponds to their actual (self-declared) rel-
ative age in school.
The imperfect correspondence between the assigned and the actual relative age is partly
due to the fact that some participants assigned as relatively young have repeated grades and
others, assigned as relatively old, have skipped grades in primary school. This is only the case
for 3% and 4% of our sample, respectively. Therefore, the main factor is the non-observance
of the school entry cut-off date due to early school entry (before becoming eligible according
to the cut-off date) (23%) or delayed entry (22%).
The decision by the child’s caregivers to opt for an early or delayed entry is likely to be
influenced by several factors which may also be correlated with the child’s characteristics.
To correct for a potential selection bias, we follow the standard practice in the relative age
literature and use the assigned relative age as an instrumental variable for the actual relative
age (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2008; Crawford et al., 2014). In our
data, the assigned relative age is a strong predictor and hence a good instrument for the
actual relative age (p<0.01, see Appendix B).
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2.2 Participants
We recruited our participants in September and October 2017 through a market and social
research company (Online Research Unit [ORU]) with one of the largest online panels in
Australia.9 Online panels are now widely used in economics, in particular Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk has become a standard tool to run online experiments (Weinzierl, 2017; Robbett
and Matthews, 2018).10 Our participants attended school in Australia, either in one state
only or in more than one state having the same cut-off date.11 To be eligible, participants
had to be born within a two-month window on each side of the cut-off date defined in the
state in which they went to school.
We recruited participants across four Australian states: Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria
and Western Australia.12 The age range of participants was adjusted based on changes
over time in the school entry cut-off date policy implemented in each state. Thus, eligible
participants are aged 24 to 35 years old in Queensland, 24 to 42 in Tasmania, 28 to 60 in
Victoria and 24 to 60 in Western Australia.13 The school entry cut-off dates which apply to
our participants is the 31st of December for Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia,
and the 30th of June for Victoria.
Based on the eligibility criteria, a total of 1083 individuals took part in the study. We
excluded 76 participants who declared being highly uncertain of whether they were among
the youngest or the oldest in the classroom during primary school in the pre-experimental
survey. On a scale from 0 to 10, a response value lower than 5 to the question on whether they
9ORU has the most accredited panel in Australia currently holding ISO 26362 (Global Access Panels),
ISO 20252 (Market Research Standard) and the AMSRO QSOAP ‘Gold Standard’ (Quality standard for
Access Panels).
10A recent comparison of an online sample (MTurk), a US representative sample and students from a US
university found that correlations between behaviour are similar across samples (Snowberg and Yariv, 2018).
11A person who went to school in more than one state was eligible to participate if the states had the same
school entry cut-off date in place throughout her 12 years of school education.
12These are the states where cut-off dates have been used as a rule to determine school entry eligibility
over a sustained period of time and that remained unchanged for a time span of at least 10 years.
13The age limit of eligible participants is substantially smaller in Queensland and Tasmania compared to
Victoria and Western Australia since it was much later that the school entry cut-off dates became a strong
norm in the former two states to determine school entry eligibility.
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had been among the oldest or the youngest students in the classroom was used to exclude
participants.14 They account for 7% of the sample only and although we opted to exclude
these participants, all our results are robust to including them in the sample.15 Overall, our
participants were quite confident about their relative age in school with three-quarters of
them having chosen a value of at least 8 on the response scale.
In Table 2 we present sociodemographic characteristics of our participant pool. A major-
ity, 64%, of our participants are women, which is typical of participant pools recruited online
(Paolacci et al., 2015).16 However, we observe no significant difference in the gender ratio
between participants born on each side of the cut-off date (p=0.48). Forty-seven percent
of our participants declared to be employed full time, 24% are employed part time, 6% are
retired, 5% are undertaking education or training and 18% are unemployed.17 With respect
to marital status, 10% of our participants are divorced, 55% are married and 35% are sin-
gle. With regard to education, the highest attainment for 25% of our participants is high
school. Thirty-nine percent have an intermediate professional degree (Certificate, Diploma)
and 36% have at least a bachelor degree.18 In terms of geographic distribution, 16% of our
participants went to school in Queensland, 3% in Tasmania, 55% in Victoria and 26% in
Western Australia. For all variables we observe no differences at conventional levels between
participants born before and after the cut-off date (p>0.05 in all cases). Finally, the average
age of our participants is 29 in Queensland, 32 in Tasmania, 44 in Victoria and 40 in Western
Australia.19
14See the full distribution of answers in Figure E.1 in the appendix.
15Results including these participants may be provided upon request.
16For instance, on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 65% of US participants are women (Paolacci et al., 2015).
17While the percentage of unemployed largely exceeds the unemployment rate in Australia (around 5.5%),
this statistic is likely to be overstated as many participants answering ‘unemployed’ may be out of the
labour force, meaning that they should not be considered unemployed according to the official unemployment
statistics.
18Our participants are more likely to have higher education than the general Australian population, a
common characteristic of participants recruited online (Paolacci et al., 2015).
19In order to test the sensitivity of our results to differences in the age span of our participants across the
different states, we reproduce the regression analysis on the subsample of participants (N=374) for which the
age range overlap across the different states (28 to 35 years old) (see Appendix D.1). We find that overall
our conclusions are unaffected by this restriction.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the participant pool
Born before/after the cut-off date
All Before After Difference
N % N % N % p-value
Gender
Female 643 64 310 65 333 63 0.48
Male 364 36 167 35 197 37
Job status
Full-time job 476 47 223 47 253 48 0.76
Part-time job 239 24 112 23 127 24 0.86
Retired 57 6 34 7 23 4 0.06
In education or training 51 5 28 6 23 4 0.27
Unemployed 184 18 80 17 104 20 0.24
Marital status
Divorced 96 10 47 10 49 9 0.74
Married 557 55 266 56 291 55 0.78
Single 349 35 161 34 188 35 0.57
Widowed 5 0 3 1 2 0 0.57
Education
High school 252 25 131 27 121 23 0.09
Certificate I/II 43 4 15 3 28 5 0.09
Certificate III/IV 202 20 103 22 99 19 0.25
Advanced diploma/Diploma 150 15 66 14 84 16 0.37
Bachelor degree or above 360 36 162 34 198 37 0.26
State
Queensland 165 16 69 14 96 18 0.12
Tasmania 30 3 11 2 19 4 0.23
Victoria 555 55 268 56 287 54 0.52
Western Australia 257 26 129 27 128 24 0.29
N 1007 100 477 100 530 100
Note: Sociodemographic statistics of our participant pool. We report the data
for the whole sample, and separately for participants born before and after the
school entry cut-off date in their state. We also report the p-value of a test of
equality of proportions between the sub-sample of participants born before and
those born after the school entry cut-off date.
2.3 Procedures
Participants performed a series of tasks online on a website specifically programmed for
this study.20 They accessed the website through a personalised link sent by ORU. They
were first invited to answer a sociodemographic survey including questions on their date of
20We follow the literature on the elicitation of individual economic preferences in laboratory experiments
(see Bardsley et al. (2010) for a discussion).
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birth and the state(s) in which they attended school. Their answers were used to identify
individuals’ assigned relative age and eligibility to take part in the study.21 Participants
were also asked whether they were among the oldest or the youngest in the classroom during
primary school, which was used to define their actual relative age, and how sure they were
about their answer. In addition, their responses on having repeated or skipped any grade
were used to infer about the reasons for potential discrepancies between the assigned relative
age and the actual relative age.
After these initial questions, participants proceeded with the online tasks. Overall the
tasks took approximately 30 minutes to complete. Prior to each task, participants went
through an instruction video using pictures and voice recording to explain the task.22 Par-
ticipants could go through the video as many times as they wanted until they decided to
proceed and start the task. Most tasks were incentivised with monetary payments. After
completing all tasks, participants were informed about their final payment, consisting of a
3 dollar fixed participation fee plus their earnings in one randomly chosen incentivised task.
They received their payment (average earnings were 14 dollars) in the form of a voucher
which can be used in major supermarket chains or department stores in Australia.
2.4 Behavioural measures
Self-confidence and competitiveness
We implement the widely used experiment by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) to study con-
fidence and competitiveness. Participants are presented with a series of real effort tasks:
finding numbers adding to 10 in a matrix containing 12 numbers with two decimal digits
(Faravelli et al., 2015). Self-confidence and competitiveness are measured as follows. Self-
confidence: difference between the participants’ actual rank (among other participants) and
their guess of their rank. Competitiveness with submitting past performance to a
21Participants eligible to take part in the study proceeded to the tasks, while the others were informed
that they were not eligible to take part in the study.
22Full instructions are provided in Appendix H.
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tournament: participants choose for their past performance to be rewarded in a piece rate
or in a competitive manner (top performers get a higher reward while others get nothing).
Competitiveness with performing in a tournament: participants choose for their next
performance to be rewarded in a piece rate or in a competitive scheme.23 By giving par-
ticipants the option to enter a tournament in these two different situations, we are able to
assess whether participants have a pure preference for competition. In that case, they would
choose to perform in a tournament more often than to submit the past performance to a
tournament.
Risk attitude
We use two standard incentive compatible methods to elicit risk attitude. First, we use a
choice list task where participants opt between safe versus risky lotteries (Holt and Laury,
2002). In the first list, participants face a risky prospect, whereas in the second list they
face an ambiguity prospect (the difference being that in the latter the exact degree of risk
faced is unknown).24 Second, we elicit risk attitude with the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART), where participants can pump a balloon which may blow up at any moment in time.
The rewards increase with the size of the balloon and vanish if the balloon blows up. The
BART has the advantage of being very easy to understand relative to the lottery choice list
task (Lejuez et al., 2002, 2007).25
In addition, we use self-assessed risk attitude measures about real life behaviour through
standard survey questions.26 Survey questions have both the advantage of being very easy
to understand and allowing to assess risk attitude in a range of specific domains. Dohmen
et al. (2011) have also found that the answers to these questions are correlated with real
23A detailed description of the task is provided in Appendix G.
24Our experimental software allowed one single switch, i.e. it did not allow inconsistent choices (Andersen
et al., 2006). At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly draws one out of the 20 rows in each
list and the participant’s choice in the selected row is considered to determine her earnings in the task.
25We describe the risk elicitation procedures in detail in Appendix G.
26The questions are formulated as follows: ‘People can behave differently in different situations. Please
rate your willingness to take risk in the following areas’ (driving, financial matters, leisure and sport, in your
occupation, with your health). The answer scale ranges from 0 to 10.
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world behaviour.
Trusting attitude
We measure trusting attitude with the standard trust question from the World Values Surveys
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). It is formulated as follows ‘Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’.
Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement on a
scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).27
Time preference
We measure time preference with ordered choice lists (Sutter et al., 2013b). Participants
are presented lists with twenty rows and need to decide in each row whether they prefer a
smaller amount of money paid at an earlier date or a larger amount paid at a later date. The
amount paid at the earlier date is fixed whereas the amount paid at a later date increases
by 50 cents in every row. Participants see two lists in successive order. In the first list, in
each row they opt between 10.50 dollars now and an amount paid in five months, ranging
from 10.50 to 20 dollars. The only difference in the second list is that both possible payment
dates are delayed by one month.28 For each list we construct a measure of future equivalent
(negatively associated with patience) based on the first row in which the participant opts
for the later payment over the earlier payment.29 One of the participant’s choices, selected
randomly, was paid on the chosen date.
27The seven answer options were ‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Mostly disagree’, ‘Somewhat disagree’, ‘Neither agree
nor disagree’, ‘Somewhat agree’, ‘Mostly agree’, ‘Strongly agree’.
28Footnote 23 also applies in this task.
29The future equivalent measure is given by the mid-point between the later payment in the row where
the participant first prefers the later payment to the earlier payment and the later payment offered in the
previous row.
12
2.5 Hypotheses
Among children, being relatively old at school has been found to positively influence impor-
tant behavioural traits, in particular self-confidence (e.g Crawford et al., 2014; Thompson
et al., 2004; Page et al., 2017) and competitiveness (Page et al., 2017). In light of existing
research findings, we make the following hypotheses about adults who were relatively old at
school:
Hypothesis 1 (Confidence). Participants who were relatively old are more self-confident
than those relatively young.
Hypothesis 2 (Competitiveness). Participants who were relatively old are more competitive
than those relatively young.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are motivated by past research on this possibility, including our
previous research on school aged children finding that relatively old children, in particular
boys, are more willing to compete and overestimate their ability relative to their peers. These
two hypotheses posit that this effect observed at school could be long lasting.
Hypothesis 3 (Risk). Participants who were relatively old are more risk seeking than those
relatively young.
Hypothesis 4 (Trust). Participants who were relatively old are more trusting than those
relatively young.
Hypothesis 5 (Patience). Participants who were relatively old are more patient than those
relatively young.
Hypotheses 3, 5 and 4 are exploratory. Our choice of investigating risk attitude and
trust is motivated by the element of confidence as more confident people are possibly more
willing to take risk, including the risk of trusting others. We also included patience as it is
considered a critical trait for economic success (Castillo et al., 2011).
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Hypothesis 6 (Gender). On the different behavioural traits we elicit, the effect of relative
age is greater for men than for women.
Hypothesis 6 is motivated by our past research which found a larger effect of relative age
on competitiveness for boys than girls at school (Page et al., 2017). Moreover, relative age
will lead to differences in height during school age which may matter more for boys than
girls due to the more physical nature of intra-gender competition for school age boys (Persico
et al., 2004). For that reason, we present all our results for male and female participants and
test for gender differences.
3 Results
We present the estimation results for the effect of relative age on behavioural traits.30 We
follow Bedard and Dhuey (2006) and use an IV regression where the participants’ assigned
relative age is used as an instrument to predict the actual relative age in school. The assigned
relative age is a binary variable, which takes on the value 1 if the participant was born after
the cut-off date and 0 if she was born before the cut-off date. The actual relative age is also
a binary variable, equal to 1 if the participant was among the oldest among her peers and
0 and she was among the youngest.31 This IV regression gives an estimation of the local
average treatment effect of having been relatively old in school on the sample of individuals
who complied with the cut-off date, under the condition that the monotonicity assumption is
satisfied. This condition assumes having no defiers (Fiorini and Stevens, 2014). In our case,
the defiers would be individuals whose school entry would have been delayed if they were
born before the cut-off date, but who would have been early entrants if they were born after
the cut-off date. Since there is no plausible reason why parents would make such decision
we can reasonably assume absence of defiers and, therefore, that monotonicity violation is
30We present descriptive statistics of our outcome variables in Appendix A.
31The first stage of the IV regression is highly significant (results are reported in Appendix B).
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unlikely to occur.32
The second stage equation of the IV estimation is as follows:
(1) yi j = β0 +β1RelativelyOldi +β2Xi + εi j
yi j is the measure for individual i of each behavioural trait j: self-confidence, competi-
tiveness, lab elicited risk attitude, self-reported risk attitude in real life domains, trust and
time preference. RelativelyOld is our main explanatory variable of interest, which takes on
the value 1 if the participant was among the oldest in her school cohort and 0 otherwise, and
is instrumented by the assigned relative age. X is a vector of control variables (age, gender
and state in which she went to school).33
In order to investigate the possible existence of gender differences in the effect of relative
age on behavioural traits (Hypothesis 6), we consider a second model obtained by adding to
equation (1) an interaction between the relative age and gender. The model is as follows:
(2) yi j = β0 +β1RelativelyOldi +β2RelativelyOldi ·Male+β3Xi + εi j
For simplicity, when presenting our results we only report the estimates of RelativelyOld
from equation (1) (average effect of relative age across the whole sample), and the estimates
32Our sample includes compliers, that is, individuals whose actual relative age is determined by their
date of birth. It also includes non-compliers, who can either be always takers or never takers. The always
(never) takers are individuals who would always have been relatively old (young) irrespective of whether
they were born before or after the cut-off date. However, these non-compliers are not taken into account
in the estimation of the local average treatment effect, since their actual relative age is not affected by
the instrument. We thank Katrien Stevens for her insightful comments on this aspect of our identification
strategy.
33Our results are robust to using a specification with additional control variables, including employment
and marriage status, education and BMI. Controlling for these factors may increase the precision of the
coefficient estimate of our main variable of interest. At the same time there is a risk of endogeneity with
these additional control variables being influenced by the participant’s behavioural traits (reverse causality).
For that reason, we only use them as robustness checks (results are available from the authors upon request).
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of RelativelyOld for male and female participants, as well as the difference between the two
(i.e. the estimates of the interaction term) obtained with equation (2). The standard errors
of RelativelyOld for female participants and the interaction term are obtained directly from
the estimation of equation (2); the standard errors of RelativelyOld for male participants are
obtained using the delta method.
We conduct more than one test for the effect of relative age on some behavioural traits
which increases the chances of a type I error, that is, concluding in favour of a statistically
significant effect of relative age in the absence of a true effect. This is the case for self-
confidence in one’s rank, risk attitude elicited with lab methods, self-reported risk attitude
in real life domains and time preference, since for each of these behavioural traits we have
at least two outcome measures. We use two standard methods allowing us to correct for the
potential multiple inference problem. First, for each behavioural trait we pool the multiple
measures into a standardized summary index and estimate the effect of relative age on this
index.34 Second, we report the family-wise error rate (FWER) p-values which are adjusted
upwards to reduce the probability of a false rejection.35 Our results are generally consistent
across the different methods (standard p-value approach, summary standardized index test
and FWER p-value approach.)
3.1 Self-confidence and competitiveness
Our measure of self-confidence, given by the difference between a participant’s actual rank
(in percentile) and her guessed rank, indicates overconfidence for positive values and under-
34The summary index is a weighted mean of all standardized measures for the same behavioural trait
and is obtained following Anderson (2008). It has the advantage of being robust to overtesting because
each index represents a single test. Moreover, it may be more powerful than individual outcome tests,
since multiple outcomes that approach marginal significance may aggregate into a single index that attains
statistical significance (Anderson, 2008). The procedure used to calculate the standardized summary index
is described in Appendix F.
35The family-wise error rate (FWER) p-values are obtained based on 10,000 iterations of the free step-
down resampling method of Westfall and Young (1993). See Anderson (2008), Finkelstein et al. (2012) and
Jones et al. (2018) for more detailed descriptions and applications of this method.
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confidence for negative values.36
We show in Figure 1 the average level of self-confidence of our participants by splitting the
sample in two groups - those born before and those born after the school entry cut-off date.
When looking at self-confidence in the piece rate stage of the effort task (top half of Figure
1), it appears that participants born before the cut-off date are on average underconfident,
whereas those born after the cut-off date are on average overconfident. Being born after the
cut-off date is associated with greater self-confidence for both men and women. With respect
to the tournament stage (bottom half of Figure 1), we find a similar pattern, which is more
pronounced for women than for men.
36The average value of self-confidence in the piece rate stage is -1 (1 for males and -2 for female participants).
In the competitive stage, the average value is 1 (2 for males and 1 for female participants). We did not observe
differences in task performance according to relative age (results are reported in Appendix C Table C.1).
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Figure 1: Self-confidence: in piece rate (top), in tournament (bottom). Note: On the x-axis,
‘Before’ refers to being born before the cut-off date (assigned to be relatively young) and
‘After’ refers to being born after the cut-off date (assigned to be relatively old).
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We report in Table 3 the IV estimates for the effect of relative age on self-confidence. We
find that having been relatively old in school increases confidence with respect to one’s rank
by about 11 percentile points in the piece rate stage (column 1) and 9 percentile points in the
tournament stage (column 2). These results are statistically significant at 1 and 5 percent
level respectively. When looking at the results for male and female participants, we observe
that the effect is larger for males in the piece rate stage and smaller in the tournament
stage but the gender differences are not statistically significant (p≈0.5). Since we consider
two measures of self-confidence, we also estimate the effect of relative age on a standardized
index, indicating that having been relatively old is associated with a 0.32 standard deviation
increase in self-confidence (significant at the 1 percent level). Moreover, the family-wise error
rate p-values support a positive effect of relative age on self-confidence (adj. p<0.05) and
no gender difference in the effect of relative age on self-confidence.
Our results indicate that having been relatively old in school may have long term effects
on self-confidence, in line with Hypothesis 1, an effect which, in contrast with Hypothesis 6,
does not differ between men and women.
Result 1 (Confidence). Having been relatively old in school is associated with higher confi-
dence in one’s performance.
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Table 3: Effect of relative age on self-confidence
Self-confidence
Piece-rate Tournament Std index
(1) (2) (3)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 10.908 8.924 0.321
se (4.094) (4.132) (0.120)
p-value [0.008] [0.031] [0.007]
adj. p-value [0.014] [0.030]
Equation (2)
Female 8.886 10.555 0.314
se (4.474) (4.613) (0.132)
p-value [0.047] [0.022] [0.018]
adj. p-value [0.046] [0.042]
Male 16.124 4.720 0.338
se (9.094) (8.735) (0.260)
p-value [0.076] [0.589] [0.195]
adj. p-value [0.118] [0.589]
Difference -7.238 5.835 -0.024
se (10.128) (9.871) (0.292)
p-value [0.475] [0.554] [0.936]
adj. p-value [0.667] [0.667]
N 1007 1007 1007
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-
values and p-values adjusted for multiple testing, con-
trolling for family-wise error rate (FWER), in square
brackets. All regression models control for gender,
age and state. We report the average effect of being
relatively old obtained by estimating equation (1),
and the average effect of being relatively old for fe-
male and male participants (as well as the difference),
obtained by estimating equation (2). Standard errors
for Female and Difference are obtained directly from
estimation of equation 2; standard errors for Male are
obtained using the delta method.
We now discuss the results on the effect of relative age on competitiveness, reported in
Table 4. Participants had two opportunities to opt for competition, first they could opt for
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the tournament payment scheme and then perform the effort task; second, they could opt
for the tournament payment scheme for their past performance (in the first [piece rate] stage
of the task).37 Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) we interpret submitting the past
performance to a tournament payment scheme as potentially influenced by confidence and
risk attitude and the choice of performing under a tournament payment scheme as potentially
influenced by the same variables plus a pure preference for competition itself.
We find that participants who were relatively old in school are more likely to submit their
past performance to the tournament payment scheme by 12 percentage points (p=0.026,
column 1).38 The point estimates are very similar in magnitude for men and women and
they are not statistically different (p=0.854). When controlling for the participant’s self-
confidence (rank guessed for the piece rate stage), the effect of relative age is halved and
becomes statistically non-significant (p=0.177, column 2). In columns 3 and 4 we present
the estimation results for the choice to perform in a tournament. We do not observe any
significant effect of relative age. It is true overall and also when considering the effect for
men and women (column 3). Controlling for self-confidence and the choice to submit the
past performance to a tournament gives similar results (column 4).39
Overall, the results suggest that relative age in school may have a long lasting effect on
competitiveness (Hypothesis 2) through an effect on self-confidence.
Result 2 (Competitiveness). Having been relatively old in school is associated with higher
competitiveness when offered the possibility to enter the past performance into a tournament.
Nonetheless, it is not associated with being more competitive when having to choose whether
37The proportion of participants choosing the competitive payment scheme for their next performance is
25% (19 and 36% for female and male participants respectively). Twenty-four percent of the participants
submitted their past performance to the competitive payment scheme. The numbers were 20% among females
participants and 31% among male participants.
38We report the estimates obtained with a linear model instead of a probit model even though our de-
pendent variable is binary, since the probit model does not allow for an interpretation of the estimates for
interaction terms (in our case, the interaction between relative age and gender). Neither the magnitude nor
the statistical significance of the marginal effects obtained with the IV probit model differ from the coefficient
estimates obtained with the IV linear model reported in Table 4.
39In the regression analysis of the effect of relative age on competitiveness, we do not calculate family-wise
p-values or estimate the effect of relative age on standardized summary index in columns (1)-(4), since a
different model is estimated for each outcome variable.
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to perform in a tournament.
Table 4: Effect of relative age on competitiveness
Submit to tournament Perform in tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.122 0.070 0.036 -0.028
se (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.049)
p-value [0.026] [0.177] [0.513] [0.560]
Equation (2)
Female 0.129 0.083 0.092 0.018
se (0.059) (0.055) (0.057) (0.051)
p-value [0.028] [0.135] [0.104] [0.718]
Male 0.104 0.036 -0.111 -0.149
se (0.125) (0.118) (0.133) (0.116)
p-value [0.405] [0.759] [0.405] [0.200]
Difference 0.025 0.047 0.203 0.167
se (0.138) (0.131) (0.144) (0.128)
p-value [0.854] [0.721] [0.159] [0.190]
N 1007 1007 1007 1007
Controls
Piece rate performance
Guessed piece rate rank
Tournament performance
Piece rate - tournament performance
Guessed tournament rank
Piece rate submitted to tournament
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. All regression models control for gender, age and state. We
report the average effect of being relatively old obtained by estimating equation
(1), and the average effect of being relatively old for female and male participants
(as well as the difference), obtained by estimating equation (2). Standard errors
for Female and Difference are obtained directly from estimation of equation 2;
standard errors for Male are obtained using the delta method.
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3.2 Risk attitude
We present in Table 5 the IV estimation results obtained with our lab elicited measures of risk
attitude: choice lists (lottery) and BART. The results obtained using the risk measure from
the lottery task suggest that overall, relative age does not impact risk attitude (p=0.548,
column 1).40 When looking at the results for male and female participants, the coefficient
for the relative age effect is larger for female participants than for male participants. This
difference is significant when using unadjusted p-values (p=0.037) but not when adjusting
for multiple comparison (adj. p=0.097). In regard to the preference over ambiguity, we find
no effect of relative age overall (p=0.3, column 2), and no difference between men and women
(p=0.367, column 2).41
Looking at the BART, we follow Lejuez et al. (2002) and use the total number of pumps
in the balloon as our primary measure of propensity to take risk task.42 We observe that
the total number of pumps of participants who were relatively old in school is lower by
about 15 units compared to the relatively young ones (column 3). The effect is however
not statistically significant at the 5 percent threshold (p=0.057; adj. p=0.166). The point
estimate of the effect is larger for male participants (28 versus 9 for female participants) but
the difference is not statistically different (p=0.325; adj. p=0.546).
When considering a standardized summary index of lab elicited risk attitude based on
all three tasks, we find no effect of relative age on risk attitude (column 4). In summary, our
results on the effect of relative age on lab elicited risk attitude measures provide no support
for Hypothesis 3 on the effect of relative age at school on risk attitude.
40The risk seeking measure from the lottery task takes values between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating extreme
risk aversion and 1 extreme risk love. The average value of the risk seeking variable is 0.5 for the whole
sample, 0.49 and 0.52 for female and male participants respectively.
41The ambiguity seeking variable takes values between -1 (extreme ambiguity aversion) and 1 (extreme
ambiguity love). The average ambiguity aversion value is -0.06 for both male and female participants.
42The sample average is 103 pumps; 104 for female and 101 for male participants. BART risk seeking
variable is the total number of clicks over the balloon numbers 2 to 5 (the first balloon is excluded as learning
is likely to take place).
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Table 5: Effect of relative age on risk and ambiguity seeking, and trust
Lottery BART Std Index Trust
Risk Ambiguity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.022 0.046 -14.543 0.034 0.355
se (0.037) (0.045) (7.649) (0.071) (0.171)
p-value [0.548] [0.300] [0.057] [0.630] [0.038]
adj. p-value [0.558] [0.504] [0.166]
Equation (2)
Female 0.073 0.020 -9.464 0.087 0.406
se (0.042) (0.049) (8.480) (0.079) (0.192)
p-value [0.082] [0.685] [0.264] [0.269] [0.035]
adj. p-value [0.216] [0.684] [0.467]
Male -0.109 0.114 -27.639 -0.103 0.223
se (0.077) (0.094) (16.458) (0.148) (0.352)
p-value [0.156] [0.225] [0.093] [0.484] [0.526]
adj. p-value [0.260] [0.260] [0.221]
Difference 0.183 -0.095 18.174 -0.191 0.183
se (0.088) (0.105) (18.474) (0.166) (0.398)
p-value [0.037] [0.367] [0.325] [0.251] [0.647]
adj. p-value [0.097] [0.546] [0.546]
N 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; p-values and p-values adjusted for
multiple testing, controlling for family-wise error rate (FWER), in
square brackets. All regression models control for gender, age and
state. We report the average effect of being relative old obtained by
estimating equation (1), and the average effect of being relatively old
for female and male participants (as well as the difference), obtained
by estimating equation (2). Standard errors for Female and Differ-
ence are obtained directly from estimation of equation 2; standard
errors for Male are obtained using the delta method.
In addition to elicitation of risk attitude through choices in a controlled setting, partici-
pants indicated their tendency to take risk in general and in specific domains - car driving,
financial matters, health, leisure and occupation - on a 11-point Likert scale. A larger value
indicates higher tolerance to risk. We show in Figure 2 the average level of self assessed risk
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taking for participants born before and those born after the cut-off date. There is a general
pattern of higher tolerance to risk for participants born after the cut-off date (assigned to
be relatively old) compared to those born before the cut-off date (assigned to be relatively
young). This difference is statistically significant at conventional levels in all five specific
domains, but not in general risk taking.
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Figure 2: Self-assessed risk tolerance in real life situations. Note: On the x-axis, ‘Before’
refers to being born before the cut-off date (assigned to be relatively young) and ‘After’ refers
to being born after the cut-off date (assigned to be relatively old).
In Table 6 we present the IV estimation results for the effect of relative age on risk taking
in the different domains. The results are in line with the descriptive observation and provide
support for Hypothesis 3. Relative age has a positive and statistically significant effect on
the self-assessed likelihood to take risk in car driving (at the 1% level), financial matters and
health (at the 5% level). Overall, we find no indication of gender difference in the effect of
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relative age on these domains (p>0.1 in all cases), providing no support for Hypothesis 6.
The adj. p-values are smaller than 5 percent for risk taking in car driving only. The effect
of relative age on the standardized index indicates that being relatively old leads to a 0.24
standard deviation increase in risk taking in real life situations, statistically significant at
the 5 percent level.
Table 6: Effect of relative age on risk seeking behaviour in real life situations
In general Driving Finance Health Leisure Occupation Std Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.256 1.049 0.705 0.693 0.456 0.618 0.241
se (0.279) (0.368) (0.323) (0.341) (0.307) (0.328) (0.100)
p-value [0.359] [0.004] [0.029] [0.042] [0.137] [0.060] [0.016]
adj. p-value [0.366] [0.021] [0.107] [0.133] [0.230] [0.140]
Equation (2)
Female 0.325 1.039 0.793 0.845 0.499 0.610 0.266
se (0.304) (0.409) (0.363) (0.385) (0.348) (0.367) (0.113)
p-value [0.286] [0.011] [0.029] [0.028] [0.151] [0.096] [0.019]
adj. p-value [0.287] [0.049] [0.106] [0.161] [0.250] [0.217]
Male 0.078 1.073 0.478 0.300 0.345 0.638 0.177
se (0.604) (0.775) (0.662) (0.703) (0.620) (0.689) (0.204)
p-value [0.898] [0.166] [0.470] [0.669] [0.578] [0.354] [0.386]
adj. p-value [0.908] [0.533] [0.884] [0.908] [0.908] [0.813]
Difference 0.247 -0.033 0.314 0.544 0.154 -0.028 -0.089
se (0.672) (0.872) (0.750) (0.800) (0.706) (0.778) (0.232)
p-value [0.713] [0.969] [0.675] [0.496] [0.827] [0.971] [0.701]
adj. p-value [0.993] [0.999] [0.993] [0.962] [0.993] [0.999]
N 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; p-values and p-values adjusted for multiple testing, controlling for family-wise
error rate (FWER), in square brackets. All regression models control for gender, age and
state. We report the average effect of being relative old obtained by estimating equation (1),
and the average effect of being relatively old for female and male participants (as well as the
difference), obtained by estimating equation (2). Standard errors for Female and Difference
are obtained directly from estimation of equation 2; standard errors for Male are obtained
using the delta method.
Our results suggest that relative age is a relevant factor in shaping risk attitude in real
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life situations, with participants who were relatively old in school declaring higher tolerance
to risk. A possible reason for the difference in results obtained across different measures of
risk attitude is that risk aversion in small experimental tasks may imperfectly predict real
life behaviour (Verschoor et al., 2016). Another possible reason for this difference could be
that the relative age differences in real life risk taking are not driven by pure risk preferences
(measured in our experimental tasks). Rather, differences in risk taking in real life could
be driven by self-confidence. Self-confidence cannot play a role in our experimental tasks
as participants have no control over the outcome. The probability of an adverse event
is determined by the experiment and a random draw from the computer determines the
outcome. In contrast, in real life situations, skill is likely to influence both the probability
of an adverse event and the outcome. It is possible that the higher self-confidence exhibited
by participants who were relatively old can lead to greater risk taking in real life situations
where skill influences outcomes. They may overestimate their chance of success when taking
risk since they are more confident about their skills (Krueger and Dickson, 1994).
Result 3 (Risk attitude). Having been relatively old in school is associated with higher
propensity to take risk in real life situations.
3.3 Trusting attitude
Participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale the extent to which they think other
people can be trusted. We present the IV estimation results of the effect of relative age on
this measure of trust in column 5 of Table 5. We find that relative age has a positive impact
on trust. Trust in others of participants who were relatively old exceeds that of participants
who were relatively young by approximately 0.4 units significant at the 5 percent level. Our
results provide support for Hypothesis 4, but not for Hypothesis 6 as the gender difference
is not statistically significant (p=0.647).
Result 4 (Trust). Having been relatively old in school leads to higher trusting attitude.
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3.4 Time preference
Our measure of time preference is obtained with two choice lists. In the first list, participants
choose between $10.50 now and an equal or higher amount with a delayed payment time of
five months. The amount to be paid in five months starts at $10.50 in the first row, increasing
by 50 cents in each row. In the second list both payments are delayed. The earlier payment
is in one month and the later payment in six months. We calculate future equivalents (FE),
as in Sutter et al. (2013b), based on the row in which the participant switches from preferring
the earlier payment to preferring the later payment.43 The later a participant opts for the
(larger) later payment instead of the earlier payment, the larger is the FE, indicating lower
patience. We present the IV estimation results for the effect of relative age on the FE for
each list and the standardized index in Table D.5. In all specifications we find no evidence
that relative age influences patience (p>0.05; adj. p>0.05) and therefore no support for
Hypothesis 5.
Result 5 (Patience). Having been relatively old in school does not influence patience.
43The FE measure takes values between 10.25 and 20.25.
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Table 7: Effect of relative age on time preference (future equivalents)
Now vs 5 months 1 vs 6 months Std Index
(1) (2) (3)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All -0.033 -0.322 -0.048
se (0.493) (0.486) (0.125)
p-value [0.947] [0.508] [0.700]
adj. p-value [0.946] [0.674]
Equation (2)
Female -0.190 -0.389 -0.079
se (0.550) (0.543) (0.140)
p-value [0.730] [0.474] [0.574]
adj. p-value [0.732] [0.636]
Male 0.372 -0.149 0.030
se (1.036) (1.011) (0.263)
p-value [0.719] [0.883] [0.910]
adj. p-value [0.877] [0.883]
Difference -0.562 -0.240 0.109
se (1.168) (1.143) (0.296)
p-value [0.631] [0.834] [0.714]
adj. p-value [0.799] [0.832]
N 1007 1007 1007
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-values and p-values
adjusted for multiple testing, controlling for family-wise error
rate (FWER), in square brackets. All regression models con-
trol for gender, age and state. We report the average effect
of being relative old obtained by estimating equation (1), and
the average effect of being relatively old for female and male
participants (as well as the difference), obtained by estimat-
ing equation (2). Standard errors for Female and Difference
are obtained directly from estimation of equation 2; standard
errors for Male are obtained using the delta method.
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4 Discussion
We investigated if being among the oldest versus the youngest at school has long lasting con-
sequences on behavioural traits: self-confidence, competitiveness, tolerance to risk, trusting
attitude and patience. We conducted an online experimental survey covering a large sample
of Australian adults who were either among the oldest or the youngest in their school co-
hort. We find that participants who were relatively old in school exhibit higher self-confidence
about their performance at an effort task compared to those who were relatively young. They
are also more likely to choose to submit their past performance to a tournament instead of
being paid in a piece rate. Moreover, they declare being more tolerant to risk in a range of
real life situations and trusting of other people in social interactions.
Taken together this set of results offers important insights on the long term effects of
relative age at school on behavioural traits. While the effect of relative age on a range of ed-
ucational and professional outcomes is well documented, little is known about the underlying
mechanisms driving these differences. Our findings suggest potential psychological pathways
for relative age at school to impact people’s success in adulthood. We find that people who
were relatively old exhibit greater self-confidence as well as greater risk tolerance, compet-
itiveness and trusting attitude which tend to be associated with economic success (see, for
example, Filippin and Paccagnella, 2012; Buser et al., 2014).
Our results do not necessarily lead to conclude that relative age has a causal effect on risk
attitude and preference for competition as such. A possible explanation for the positive effect
of relative age in risk taking in real life situations is that participants who were relatively
old at school may take more risk because of greater self-confidence (associated with more
optimistic beliefs in chances of success), not because of higher tolerance to risk. Similarly,
the choice of submitting one’s past performance to a tournament could be a reflection of
greater self-confidence (higher expectations in terms of rank).
We conjecture that greater self-confidence is acquired throughout the many years of school
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where people who were relatively old enjoyed greater success than their peers due to their
additional maturity. Being relatively old may confer greater maturity helping students to
perform well at school and be confident in their ability to do so when comparing themselves
to their peers or through feedback from teachers. It can also help students gain confidence
in physical competition in sports.
Interestingly, we did not find noticeable evidence of gender differences in relative age
effect. We hypothesised that it would be the case due to the possible role of height and
differences in body size in competitions between boys at school. The evidence we find does
not provide support for this phenomenon.
Finally, our findings suggest a connection between behavioural traits and professional
success. Relative age at school has been found to have a substantial effect on later professional
outcomes. Studying the effect of relative age on behavioural traits can help cast a light on
the role of these traits in professional success. More generally, the understanding gained from
our study can inform policy, for example, related to work environments, in alleviating the
disadvantage faced by people who were relatively young at school. It can in particular help
inform the design of curriculum and assessment programs to avoid the unintended penalty
imposed upon relatively young students who were born before the cut-off date rather than
after it.
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Appendix
A Summary statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables
mean sd median min max
Self-confidence and competitiveness
Self-confidence in piece rate -1.1 30.8 -3.4 -75.2 99
Self-confidence in tournament 1.4 31.1 -2.7 -82.8 99
Competition without involvement 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Competition with involvement 0.25 0.44 0 0 1
Risk, ambiguity and trust
Lottery risk seeking 0.48 0.28 0.45 0 1
Lottery ambiguity seeking -0.06 0.33 0 -1 1
BART 102.9 57.4 92.0 0 329
Trust 3.4 1.3 4.0 0 6
Risk questions
In general 5.4 2.1 6 0 10
Driving 4.0 2.8 4 0 10
Finance 4.7 2.5 5 0 10
Health 4.3 2.6 5 0 10
Leisure 5.6 2.4 6 0 10
Occupation 5.0 2.5 5 0 10
Future equivalents
Now versus 5 months 16.0 3.7 15.3 10.3 20.3
1 month versus 6 months 15.6 3.7 15.3 10.3 20.3
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B IV first stage regression
Table B.1: First stage of IV regression
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.476
se (0.028)
p-value [0.000]
Equation (2)
Female 0.533
se (0.033)
p-value [0.000]
Male 0.373
se (0.048)
p-value [0.000]
N 1007
Note: Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Controls for gender, age
and state.
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C Effect of relative age on performance
Table C.1: Effect of relative age on performance
Piece rate Tournament
(1) (2)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All -0.361 -0.830
se (0.501) (0.550)
p-value [0.471] [0.131]
Equation (2)
Female -0.292 -0.457
se (0.510) (0.579)
p-value [0.567] [0.430]
Male -0.540 -1.791
se ( 1.202) (1.257)
p-value [0.654] [0.154]
Difference 0.248 1.335
se (1.300) (1.377)
p-value [0.849] [0.332]
N 1007 1007
Note: Estimates obtained with IV lin-
ear regression models. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Controls
for gender, age and state.
D Robustness of results
D.1 Using an age range for participants identical across states
In this section, we report the results considering only participants in the overlapping age range of
28 to 35 years old across the four Australian states. The results are very similar with those in the
main text and in particular our conclusion about self-confidence are supported similarly by these
results.
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Table D.1: Effect of relative age on self-confidence
Self-confidence
Piece rate Tournament
(1) (2)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 22.154 26.215
se (7.536) (7.864)
p-value [0.003] [0.001]
Equation (2)
Female 15.855 27.422
se (8.325) (8.794)
p-value [0.057] [0.002]
Male 37.386 23.296
se (17.293) (16.363)
p-value [0.031] [0.155]
Difference -21.531 4.126
se (19.322) (18.570)
p-value [0.265] [0.824]
N 374 374
Note: Estimates obtained with IV lin-
ear regression models. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Controls
for gender, age and state.
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Table D.2: Effect of relative age on competitiveness
Submit to tournament Perform in tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.343 0.294 0.164 -0.028
se (0.104) (0.097) (0.103) (0.084)
p-value [0.001] [0.002] [0.111] [0.742]
Equation (2)
Female 0.405 0.360 0.223 -0.017
se (0.122) (0.117) (0.112) (0.095)
p-value [0.001] [0.002] [0.047] [0.867]
Male 0.189 0.137 0.015 -0.054
se (0.203) (0.189) (0.228) (0.185)
p-value [0.351] [0.470] [0.946] [0.769]
Difference 0.215 0.223 0.208 0.038
se (0.238) (0.225) (0.252) (0.212)
p-value [0.366] [0.322] [0.410] [0.859]
N 374 374 374 374
Controls
Piece rate performance
Guessed piece rate rank
Tournament performance
Piece rate - tournament performance
Guessed tournament rank
Piece rate submitted to tournament
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Controls for gender, age and state.
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Table D.3: Effect of relative age on risk and ambiguity seeking, and trust
Lottery BART Trust
Risk Ambiguity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All -0.011 0.057 -15.384 0.672
se (0.055) (0.076) (13.934) (0.300)
p-value [0.834] [0.452] [0.270] [0.025]
Equation (2)
Female -0.007 0.016 -10.149 0.925
se (0.066) (0.084) (16.301) (0.352)
p-value [0.913] [0.845] [0.534] [0.009]
Male -0.022 0.157 -28.042 0.061
se (0.097) (0.157) (26.210) (0.582)
p-value [0.821] [0.318] [0.285] [0.917]
Difference 0.014 -0.140 17.893 0.864
se (0.117) (0.176) (30.726) (0.675)
p-value [0.901] [0.425] [0.560] [0.201]
N 374 374 374 374
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Con-
trols for gender, age and state.
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Table D.4: Effect of relative age on risk seeking behaviour in real life situations
In general Driving Finance Health Leisure Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.081 1.520 1.218 0.585 0.663 0.166
se (0.447) (0.702) (0.602) (0.607) (0.538) (0.574)
p-value [0.855] [0.030] [0.043] [0.336] [0.218] [0.773]
Equation (2)
Female 0.434 0.815 0.950 0.642 0.318 -0.073
se (0.495) (0.799) (0.685) (0.707) (0.611) (0.643)
p-value [0.381] [0.308] [0.165] [0.364] [0.603] [0.910]
Male -0.771 3.225 1.867 0.447 1.498 0.743
se (0.978) (1.465) (1.199) (1.183) (1.073) (1.167)
p-value [0.431] [0.028] [0.119] [0.706] [0.163] [0.525]
Difference 1.205 -2.410 -0.916 0.195 -1.181 -0.816
se (1.097) (1.654) (1.366) (1.379) (1.227) (1.322)
p-value [0.272] [0.145] [0.502] [0.888] [0.336] [0.537]
N 374 374 374 374 374 374
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Controls for gender, age and state.
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Table D.5: Effect of relative age on time preference (future equivalents)
Now vs 5 months 1 vs 6 months
(1) (2)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All -0.956 -1.185
se (0.860) (0.837)
p-value [0.267] [0.157]
Equation (2)
Female -0.159 -0.282
se (0.970) (0.955)
p-value [0.870] [0.768]
Male -2.883 -3.369
se (1.870) (1.905)
p-value [0.123] [0.077]
Difference 2.724 3.087
se (2.090) (2.134)
p-value [0.192] [0.148]
N 374 374
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear re-
gression models. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Controls for gender, age and
state.
D.2 Restricting the sample to participants born within a one-month window of
the cutoff date
In this section we report all regression results restricting the sample to participants who were born
either one month prior or after the school entry cut-off date. This subsample counts with 527
participants, of which 329 are female and 198 are male.
Overall, the effects reported with the full sample are unaffected or become larger in magnitude
when considering the restricted sample providing further support for the role of relative age in
explaining the reported differences in self-confidence and tendency to take risks in real life domains.
We describe below in detail the small differences in the results.
The effect sizes for the effect of relative age on self-confidence almost double in size and remain
statistically significant at conventional levels. When looking at the effect of relative age on the
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decision to submit the piece rate performance to a tournament, we see that the effect becomes
smaller and statistically non-significant, but we still observe that it is substantially attenuated
when controlling for beliefs about own rank. With respect to risk taking in the experimental
tasks, the effect of relative age remains statistically non-significant, except for the BART where the
(negative) effect of relative age in risk taking almost doubles and becomes marginally significant at
10%. The effect on the standardized index for risk taking over all the experimental tasks remains
however non-significant. With regards to risk taking in real life domains, the effect sizes generally
increase and the statistical significance decreases due to the loss in statistical power. The magnitude
of the effect of relative age on the standardized index for risk taking in real life domains remains
unaffected and stays marginally significant at 10%. With respect to trust, the effect of relative age
slightly decreases and becomes non-significant.
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Table D.6: Effect of relative age on self-confidence
Self-confidence
Piece-rate Tournament Std index
(1) (2) (3)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 18.118 17.894 0.554
se (6.704) (6.637) (0.187)
p-value [0.007] [0.007] [0.003]
adj. p-value [0.011] [0.011]
Equation (2)
Female 18.509 17.911 0.560
se (7.386) (7.178) (0.204)
p-value [0.012] [0.013] [0.006]
adj. p-value [0.020] [0.020]
Male 17.037 17.847 0.536
se (14.219) (14.615) (0.402)
p-value [0.231] [0.222] [0.182]
adj. p-value [0.321] [0.321]
Difference 1.472 0.063 0.023
se (15.830) (16.095) (0.445)
p-value [0.926] [0.997] [0.958]
adj. p-value [0.991] [0.998]
N 527 527 527
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-
values and p-values adjusted for multiple testing, con-
trolling for family-wise error rate (FWER), in square
brackets. All regression models control for gender,
age and state.
47
Table D.7: Effect of relative age on competitiveness
Submit to tournament Perform in tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.074 0.020 -0.019 -0.071
se (0.086) (0.080) (0.085) (0.075)
p-value [0.387] [0.799] [0.826] [0.345]
Equation (2)
Female 0.135 0.080 0.103 0.023
se (0.088 ) (0.082) (0.085) (0.076)
p-value [0.127] [0.332] [0.226] [0.764]
Male -0.102 -0.145 -0.370 -0.331
se (0.202) (0.195) (0.218) (0.197)
p-value [0.615] [0.456] [0.090] [0.092]
Difference 0.237 0.225 0.473 0.354
se (0.217) (0.210) (0.229) (0.210)
p-value [0.276] [0.284] [0.039] [0.092]
N 527 527 527 527
Controls
Piece rate performance
Guessed piece rate rank
Tournament performance
Piece rate - tournament performance
Guessed tournament rank
Piece rate submitted to tournament
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. All regression models control for gender, age and state.
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Table D.8: Effect of relative age on risk and ambiguity seeking, and trust
Lottery BART Std Index Trust
Risk Ambiguity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All -0.056 0.115 -26.940 -0.030 0.247
se (0.059) (0.066) (11.836) (0.109) (0.252)
p-value [0.336] [0.081] [0.023] [0.783] [0.328]
adj. p-value [0.346] [0.157] [0.066]
Equation (2)
Female 0.000 0.083 -21.741 0.021 0.380
se (0.065) (0.068) (12.263) (0.118) (0.288)
p-value [1.000] [0.223] [0.076] [0.861] [0.187]
adj. p-value [1.000] [0.387] [0.201]
Male -0.212 0.203 -41.307 -0.171 -0.123
se (0.129) (0.155) (28.672) (0.241) (0.508)
p-value [0.098] [0.189] [0.150] [0.480] [0.809]
adj. p-value [0.212] [0.245] [0.245]
Difference 0.212 -0.120 19.567 0.191 0.503
se (0.142) (0.166) (30.988) (0.266) (0.581)
p-value [0.136] [0.470] [0.528] [0.472] [0.387]
adj. p-value [0.312] [0.721] [0.721]
N 527 527 527 527 527
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust
standard errors in parentheses; p-values and p-values adjusted for
multiple testing, controlling for family-wise error rate (FWER), in
square brackets. All regression models control for gender, age and
state.
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Table D.9: Effect of relative age on risk seeking behaviour in real life situations
In general Driving Finance Health Leisure Occupation Std Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All 0.334 1.442 0.870 0.686 0.273 0.839 0.268
se (0.418) (0.569) (0.489) (0.523) (0.473) (0.508) (0.153)
p-value [0.424] [0.011] [0.075] [0.189] [0.563] [0.099] [0.081]
adj. p-value [0.631] [0.049] [0.255] [0.430] [0.631] [0.284]
Equation (2)
Female 0.509 1.006 0.712 0.212 0.445 0.718 0.223
se (0.440) (0.614) (0.537) (0.566) (0.529) (0.559) (0.168)
p-value [0.247] [0.101] [0.185] [0.708] [0.400] [0.199] [0.185]
adj. p-value [0.521] [0.352] [0.521] [0.702] [0.628] [0.521]
Male -0.147 2.648 1.307 1.998 -0.200 1.171 0.392
se (0.956) (1.326) (1.059) (1.198) (0.973) (1.078) (0.332)
p-value [0.878] [0.046] [0.217] [0.095] [0.837] [0.277] [0.239]
adj. p-value [0.968] [0.147] [0.495] [0.263] [0.968] [0.548]
Difference 0.656 -1.642 -0.595 -1.786 0.645 -0.453 -0.169
se (1.042) (1.446) (1.168) (1.306) (1.094) (1.197) (0.368)
p-value [0.529] [0.256] [0.611] [0.171] [0.555] [0.705] [0.646]
adj. p-value [0.915] [0.649] [0.915] [0.515] [0.915] [0.915]
N 527 527 527 527 527 527 527
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; p-values and p-values adjusted for multiple testing, controlling for family-wise
error rate (FWER), in square brackets. All regression models control for gender, age and
state.
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Table D.10: Effect of relative age on time preference (future equivalents)
Now vs 5 months 1 vs 6 months Std Index
(1) (2) (3)
Relatively old
Equation (1)
All -0.425 -0.341 -0.102
se (0.751) (0.748) (0.189)
p-value [0.572] [0.648] [0.589]
adj. p-value [0.737] [0.737]
Equation (2)
Female -0.521 -0.190 -0.095
se (0.815) (0.807) (0.203)
p-value [0.523] [0.813] [0.640]
adj. p-value [0.704] [0.812]
Male -0.160 -0.758 -0.123
se (1.656) (1.677) (0.428)
p-value [0.923] [0.651] [0.775]
adj. p-value [0.923] [0.804]
Difference -0.361 0.567 0.028
se (1.829) (1.844) (0.469)
p-value [0.844] [0.758] [0.953]
adj. p-value [0.907] [0.907]
N 527 527 527
Note: Estimates obtained with IV linear regression models.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-values and p-values
adjusted for multiple testing, controlling for family-wise error
rate (FWER), in square brackets. All regression models control
for gender, age and state.
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E Additional graphs
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Figure E.1: Participants’ rating on how sure they were about their declaration on being
among the oldest / youngest in the classroom
F Standardized summary index
Following Anderson (2008) we calculate summary indices using the formula below:
s¯i j =
1
Wi j
∑
k∈Ki j
w jk
yi jk− y¯ jk
σ yjk
where k indexes the outcome measures within each behavioural trait j, Ki j is the set of nonmiss-
ing measures for individual i in the behavioural trait j, σ yjk is the control group standard deviation
for measure k in the behavioural trait j, w jk is the measure weight from the inverted covariance
matrix ∑ˆ
−1
j , and Wi j = ∑k∈Ki j w jk.
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G Description of the tasks
Confidence and competitiveness
In the first stage of the task participants are shown grids containing 12 numbers and need to find
the two numbers in the grid which add up to exactly 10. There is only one possible solution in
each grid. Participants work on the task for 3 minutes and earn 1 dollar per correct answer. In the
second stage participants work on the same task for 3 minutes and the payment is now defined in
a competitive setting. Participants earn 3 dollars per correct answer but only if they are ranked
in the top third among a random sample of 100 participants in the experiment. In the third stage
participants work once again on the same task for 3 minutes, however, prior to performing the task
they need to decide whether they want to be paid according to a piece rate scheme (as in stage
1) or according to a competitive scheme (as in stage 2), in which case their score in stage 3 is
compared to the score in stage 2 of a random sample of 99 other participants in the experiment.
This stage is designed to measure preference for competition. In the fourth stage participants
simply decide if they want to submit their score in stage 1 to a competitive payment scheme or to
a piece rate scheme. This stage provides a measure of self-confidence and risk attitude. In the fifth
stage participants are asked to guess their rank in stage 1 and stage 2 among a random sample of
100 participants. This stage aims to measure participants’ confidence in their ability to perform in
the task relative to others.
Lottery-based task
We use the ordered choice list to measure risk aversion as in Sutter et al. (2013b). Participants
see a list with twenty rows and decide in each row whether they prefer a lottery or a certain
amount of money. The lottery is identical in each row whereas the certain amount of money offered
always increases by 1 dollar. Participants are presented with two lists successively. The first list
corresponds to the risk prospect. In each row, participants opt between a lottery in which they
have a 50% chance of earning 20 dollars and a 50% chance of earning nothing, and a certain amount
of money ranging from 1 dollar in row 1 to 20 dollars in row 20. The second list corresponds to
the ambiguity prospect and differs from the risk prospect only in the fact that participants are
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not aware of the probability of earning the 20 dollars in the lottery. The lottery is explained to
participants referring to a bag with 10 balls, of which at the end of the experiment one is randomly
picked by the computer. If the ball picked is white they earn 20 dollars, whereas they earn nothing
if the ball picked is black. In the risk prospect, participants are informed that there are five white
and five black balls in the bag. In the ambiguity prospect, participants are not informed about the
number of black and white balls in the bag. Therefore, they are unaware of the probability that a
black or white ball is randomly picked by the computer.
We construct measures of risk and ambiguity aversion following Sutter et al. (2013b), using the
certainty equivalence method. We calculate the certainty equivalent as the mid-point between the
amount of money offered in the row in which the participant first prefers the certain amount of
money over the lottery and the certain amount of money offered in the previous row. The risk
aversion measure is calculated as 1− (CErisk/20). The ambiguity aversion measure is calculated as
(CErisk−CEamb)/(CErisk +CEamb).
BART
A second method that we use to measure risk attitude is the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002). Par-
ticipants see a balloon and a pump on the computer screen. Each time the participant pumps
the balloon, earnings increase by 50 cents and the size of the balloon increases. The balloon may
explode at any random pump and the participant needs to decide when to stop pumping the bal-
loon. If the balloon explodes, the accumulated earnings in the balloon are lost. After a balloon
has either exploded or the participant has decided to stop pumping the balloon, a new balloon
appears. There are five balloons in total. At the end of the experiment, if one of the balloons is
selected for payment, the participant earns the money accumulated in the balloon if the balloon
has not exploded. If the selected balloon has exploded, the participant earns nothing. We measure
the propensity to take risk by the total number of pumps in the balloons.
Survey questions
Finally, we use a self-assessment measure of risk attitude. We use the standard general risk question
and questions on risk attitude in different relevant domains of life as in Dohmen et al. (2011). The
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exact wording of the general risk question is ‘How do you see yourself: are you generally a person
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you generally avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on
a scale where the value 0 means ‘not at all willing to take risks’ and the value 10 means ‘very
willing to take risks’. Each domain specific risk question was worded as follows: ‘People can behave
differently in different situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following
areas? a) Driving, b) Financial matters, c) During leisure and sport, d) In your occupation, e)
With your health’.
H Instructions script
Welcome to our survey. In this survey you will be asked to complete tasks which involve making
choices, playing simple games and for which you can earn money. At the start of the survey, you
will be asked to answer a short sociodemographic questionnaire. There will be 4 different tasks.
Each task has one or more parts. Before each task you will listen to the instructions for the part
you are about to complete. It is very important that you listen carefully to the instructions as
your performance and decisions in the different tasks will determine how much you will earn for
this survey. You will always have the option to listen to the instructions as many times as you
wish before you start the task. It should take you about 45 minutes to complete the entire survey.
In each part of the survey you will have the chance to earn money but you will not be paid for
all the parts. At the end of the survey one of the separate parts will be randomly selected to
determine your payment. Your expected payment for participation is 15 dollars. You will receive
your payment within 2 weeks and 6 months after having completed the survey depending on which
part is randomly selected for payment. You will be informed about which part has been selected
and when you will receive your payment immediately after the survey. If you would like more
information on the purpose of this survey and your participation, please click on the link on the
bottom of your screen. If you are ready to begin please press start.
Task One. This task will have two parts. In part 1 you will have to choose whether you prefer
safe amounts of money or drawing a ball from a bag with a chance of winning $20. The bag will be
filled with 5 white and 5 black balls. If you choose to draw the ball from the bag and it is white,
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you will receive $20; however if it is black, you will receive nothing. In the first row you decide
whether you prefer to draw a ball from a bag the possibility of wining $20 or picking $1. In the
second row, again you decide whether you prefer to draw a ball from a bag with the possibility of
winning $20 or the safe amount. This time, the safe amount is $2. As you can see, the program will
help you fill the boxes once you indicate that you prefer the safe amount over picking a ball from
the bag. It will choose all the safe amounts that are higher. You can always change your decisions
until you click submit in the bottom right hand side of the screen. At the end of the experiment,
if this part is selected for payment only one out of the 20 decisions will be used to determine your
earnings. In this example, if row 12 is selected, the participant will receive $12. If row 6 is selected,
the participant has a 50% of winning $20 and a 50% chance of winning nothing. You can now either
choose to listen to the instructions again or click on the next button if you are ready to begin the
task.
Task One, part two. This is very similar to the first part. In part 2 you will have to choose
whether you prefer safe amounts of money or drawing a ball from a bag with a chance of winning
$20. The bag will again contain 10 balls. However, this time, we will not tell you the exact number
of white and black balls. If you decide to draw a ball from the bag, you will get $20 if it is a white
ball, and nothing if it is a black ball. You can now either choose to listen to the instructions again
or click on the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Two. This task will have two parts. In part 1 you will have to decide whether you prefer a
certain amount of money today or possibly a larger amount in five months. If you decide a smaller
amount today, the money will be paid into your account once you complete the survey. If you
decide to receive a larger amount in five months, you will receive the money five months from now.
Like in the previous task, you will have to make 20 decisions on whether you prefer a given amount
of money today or a larger amount to be paid in five months. At the end of the experiment, if
this part is selected for payment, 1 out of the following 20 decisions will be randomly selected to
determine your earnings. Also like the previous task, the program will help you fill the boxes once
you indicate that you prefer the larger amount of money in five months over being paid today. You
can always change your decisions until you click submit in the bottom right hand side of the screen.
You can now either choose to listen to the instructions again or click on the next button if you are
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ready to begin the task.
Task Two, part two. This is very similar to the first part of this task. In part 2 you will have
to decide whether you prefer a certain amount of money in one month or possibly a larger amount
in 6 months. If you decide to receive a smaller amount in one month, you will receive the money
one month from now. If you decide to receive a larger amount in six months, you will receive the
money six months from now. Like in previous tasks, you will have to make 20 decisions and the
program will help you fill the boxes once you indicate that you prefer the larger amount of money
in six months over the smaller amount in one month’s time. You can always change your decisions
until you click submit in the bottom right hand side of the screen. At the end of the experiment,
if this part is selected for payment, 1 out of the following 20 decisions will be randomly selected to
determine your earnings. You can now either choose to listen to the instructions again or click on
the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Three. This task only has one part. In this task, imagine you are blowing up a balloon,
like the one on the screen. Each time you click on the button to pump up the balloon, the balloon
will increase in size and raise your earnings by 50 cents. After each click, you can choose to collect
the money or to continue blowing up the balloon. It is your choice to decide how much you would
like to blow up the balloon but be aware that at some point the balloon will burst and reset your
earnings. There are 5 balloons in total. If this task is selected for payment, you will receive the
earnings collected in one randomly selected balloon. You can now either choose to listen to the
instructions again or click on the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Four. This task will have five parts. In part 1 you will be shown grids containing 12
numbers. You will have to find the two numbers that add up to ten. There is only one pair of
numbers adding up to 10 in each grid and you can select the numbers by clicking on them, then
clicking submit. Each time you select two numbers and hit Submit, a new grid will appear. You
will have 3 minutes to complete as many grids as you can. If this part is selected for payment you
will receive $1 per correct answer. You can now either choose to listen to the instructions again or
click on the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Four. Part two is the same as part one. You will have 3 minutes to solve as many grids as
you can, however the payment will be different. Now it will depend if you are one of the participants
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that has the highest number of correct answers. 100 people are participating in this experiment.
Participants are aged between 25 and 60 years old. About half of the participants are male and
the other half are female. If you are in the top 3rd of participants in terms of number of answers
correct you will receive $3 per correct answer. If you are not in the top 3rd of participants with the
highest number of correct answers you will not get anything. You can now either choose to listen
to the instructions again or click on the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Four. Part three is once again the same as in part one. You will have 3 minutes to solve
as many grids as you can in three minutes. This time, you will be able to choose how you are paid
for it. You can choose to be paid as in Part 1, with $1 per correct answer, or like in part two,
you can choose $3 per correct answer but only if you are in the top 3rd of the participants. If you
choose the last option then your rank will be obtained by comparing your score in this part with
the score obtained by the other participants in part 2. You can now either choose to listen to the
instructions again or click on the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Four. In part 4 you will not have to solve any grids. You will only have to choose a
payment method. This payment method will be used for the number of grids you got correct in
part one. This is how it will work. First you will be informed about how many correct answers you
gave in part 1. Second you will be able to choose how to be rewarded for these correct answers.
You may want to be paid like in part 1 in that case you will receive $1 for each correct answer, or
like in part two with $3 per correct answer but only if you ranked in the top 3rd. For example,
if you had 5 correct answers in part 1 and you choose the payment method as in part one, you
will receive $5. If you choose the payment method from part two, you will receive $15 if you are
in the top third, or nothing if you are ranked below. You can now either choose to listen to the
instructions again or click on the next button if you are ready to begin the task.
Task Four. In part 5 you will not have to solve any grids or choose a payment method. You
will be asked to guess your rank in parts 1 and 2. 100 people are participating in this experiment.
Participants are aged between 25 and 60 years old. About half of the participants are male and
the other half are female. For example, if you think that you had the highest score in part 1, your
rank would be one, and you would put a one in the first box. If you think that you had the lowest
score in part 1, your rank would be one hundred, and you would put a one-hundred in the first box.
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Your guess for your rank can be any number between 1 and 100 and can be different for part one
and part two. You can now either choose to listen to the instructions again or click on the next
button if you are ready to begin the task.
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